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Abstract: This paper looks at two related labour market policies that have persisted and even proliferated 
across Europe both before and after the financial crisis: wage restraint, and punitive workfare programmes. 
It asks why these policies, despite their weak empirical records, have been so durable. Moving beyond 
comparative-institutionalist explanations which emphasise institutional stickiness, it draws on Marxist and 
Kaleckian ideas to argue that, under financialisation, the state has been pushed to adopt disciplinary and 
destabilising policies which target the working class, as a means of bolstering the ‘confidence’ of capitalists 
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measures. We argue that this process is not embedded in existing institutions, but actively disrupts or 
subverts them.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Why have neoliberal labour market policies survived the 2008 financial crisis? It cannot be due to 
their effectiveness as policies. Post-Kaleckian heterodox economic literature has challenged the 
policy of wage restraint, finding that declining wage shares have led to a chronic deficiency of 
aggregate demand, slow growth, high debt and instability in Europe (Stockhammer and Onaran, 
2012). Marxist scholarship has designated the current juncture a ‘dysfunctional accumulation 
regime’ (Vidal, 2013) which cannot produce stable growth in the long term. Such critiques are 
echoed by mainstream economists such as Stiglitz (2012) and Piketty (2014) and by social 
movements and parties in countries such as Greece and Spain. This paper examines the persistence 
and proliferation of two related disciplinary measures targeting the working class: wage restraint 
and punitive active labour market policies.  
One explanation for continuity in policymaking comes from comparative institutionalism, 
the dominant theory in comparative employment relations (Hauptmeier and Vidal 2014). The 
policy paradigms (Hall, 1993), path dependency (Pierson, 2000) and policy regimes (Campbell 
and Pedersen, 2014) approaches all suggest that policymakers will not necessarily respond 
objectively and adaptively to emerging problems, owing to the historical weight of distinct national 
institutional systems. This literature downplays the disruptive effects of liberalizing policies on 
collective bargaining and welfare state institutions, despite empirical evidence of such disruption 
in the theoretically pregnant case of Germany (e.g. Doellgast and Greer 2006; Doellgast 2012; 
Holst 2014; Baccaro and Benassi 2014). Our contribution is to develop an alternative explanation 
for the continuity and proliferation of punitive labour policies that is built on a Marxist view of 
class in capitalist societies.  
While comparative institutionalism deals with the exercise of class power through 
bargaining, lobbying, and corporatist intermediation, we argue that these observable phenomena 
are not the principal mechanisms through which policymakers respond to capital. We argue that 
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policymakers are operating in a society defined by a specific form of class relations (Clarke, 1977) 
where common sense (Bruff 2011) dictates the need to maintain the conditions for extraction of 
surplus value and its profitable reinvestment. As Kalecki (1943) argues, this demands that they 
cultivate ‘business confidence’ as a matter of urgency by reinforcing workers’ ‘fear of the sack’, 
even if this means unstable growth. We argue that one cause of the crisis – financialisation – has 
also intensified these pressures by increasing uncertainty and compressing time horizons. 
Policymakers have to win the ‘confidence’ of a diffuse and abstract ‘collective capitalist’ which 
fluctuates rapidly and unpredictably, and this means pursuing disciplinary labour market policies 
whatever their records on growth and economic stability. These pressures have disrupted and 
subverted, rather than been contained by, existing welfare and collective bargaining institutions.   
In the following  sections, we will discuss comparative institutionalist perspectives on 
policy and the Marxist alternative, focusing particularly on theorising the effects of financialisation 
on the Marxist reading of the state. Then, we discuss wage moderation policies in Europe. While 
the evidence in support of them is dubious, breaking out of mainstream policies would require 
defying the short-termist disciplinarianism demanded by financialisation. After this, we also 
discuss punitive ALMPs, where, once again, policies continue despite weak evidence of success. 
Both policy agendas, we argue, are exacerbating and will continue to exacerbate capitalist 
instability. We therefore hope to reassert a Marxist reading of class and the State as more 
constructive categories than comparative institutionalist frames in future analysis of European 
labour market policy.  
 
Path dependency and policy learning 
 
Comparative institutionalist thought contrasts the transnational diffusion of particular policies and 
ideas (such as neoliberalism) with the apparent path dependency of national systems (Fourcade-
Garrinchas and Babb, 2002; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Pierson, 2000). Exogenous pressures may 
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render national policies outdated, but the latter have their own logic and trajectory due to the 
inherent staying power of institutions. Our reading of Marxism also contrasts the universalising 
logic of capitalism with the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state, but places greater emphasis on the 
disciplinary power that capitalist class interests exert over policymakers.  
National ‘policy systems’ in institutionalist literature are highly complex (Kay, 2005), 
denoting myriad interconnected variables ranging from formal institutions, informal contact 
networks, the relative authority of competing interest groups, and even the accumulated mass of 
past decisions. Institutionalists often emphasise the ‘institutional complementarity’ of these 
systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001), with the ‘increasing returns’ (Pierson, 2000) of existing 
combinations making policy directions difficult to change once set in motion. Hence, the 
institutionalist characterisation of the policy process generally portrays it as inherently 
conservative, following entrenched patterns which are only rarely disturbed (Peters et al, 2005) by 
exogenous shocks such as economic crises.  
While conflict between business and labour is centralised in much institutionalist research 
(Thelen, 1999), the assumption is that pressures for change lead more often to incremental 
alterations than to dismantlement of or exit from existing institutions (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). 
The prospect of ‘lock-in’ is therefore raised, where certain policies persist despite apparently 
failing in their objectives (Hassink, 2005; Sydow et al, 2009). Crises de-legitimise existing policy 
regimes and catalyse the search for new ones (Campbell and Pedersen, 2014), but this is not a 
Darwinian process of replacing the outdated with the better-suited. Instead, it is a sociological one 
dependent on embedded power relations and the authority accruing to different actors (Hall, 1993). 
For example Hall (2014) has recently argued that cumbersome institutional logics across the 
Eurozone prevented the kind of ’swift action’ that could ‘restore investor confidence’ such as 
boosting demand in Germany. Policy is thus slow and awkward, prodded into change by 
exogenous shocks.  
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Neoliberalism in this account is therefore a policy paradigm associated with the discrediting of 
Keynesian ideas following economic crisis, reflecting a shift in policy authority from groups such 
as trade unions to business actors (Mudge, 2008) and the growing ‘persuasive power of the market’ 
(Peters et al, 2005: 1296). Despite its transnational scope, comparative institutionalism holds that 
its impact will be strongly mediated by national policy systems, with the latter shaping the ‘nature 
and meaning’ of the neoliberal agenda in diverse ways (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002). 
Hence neoliberalism constitutes a shifting power balance within a fundamentally pluralist system. 
Class is relevant only insofar as different actors (e.g. ‘business’ and unions) may form stronger 
coalitions or accrue more authority in advancing their own agendas. In the next two sections, we 
argue for a more fundamental analysis of class as a determining influence on state policy. We will 
suggest that this better explains the forceful push towards wage restraint and ALMPs across 
Europe, which has disrupted or subverted the role of supposedly stabilising institutions. 
 
Marxist state theory 
 
Marxist theory rejects pluralism, emphasising the state’s role in preserving and advancing 
capitalist class interests rather than balancing different ones. However, Marxists have expressed 
divergent views on the nature of the mechanisms inducing the state to act in this way. One debate 
which has defined the contours of later Marxist discussion is that between Miliband and Poulantzas 
(see Miliband, 1969, 1970, 1973; Poulantzas, 1969, 1976), often viewed as pitting an 
‘instrumentalist’ view against a ‘functionalist’ one (Skocpol, 1980). In Miliband’s (1969) account, 
the capitalist class and actors in the state apparatus tend to have shared experiences, prejudices and 
worldviews, and find themselves in close personal proximity. Hence anyone who enters the state 
apparatus, however radical before doing so, will tend to become reflexively more responsive to 
business voices than those of actors such as unions. And the ‘capitalist class’ is manifested in a 
very concrete network of individuals that have direct personal influence over the policy process. 
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Poulantzas (1969, 1976, 2000) vehemently criticised this account, instead viewing the state as a 
crystallisation of class relations in a much more impersonal and abstract sense. By internalising 
class conflict within itself as political conflict, the state can detach itself from the ‘class fractions’ 
to organise them in the interests of the long-term stability of the capitalist system as a whole. Since 
it defines the state’s role by the purpose it fulfils, Poultanzas’s theorisation has been critiqued for 
its functionalism (Clarke, 1977; Skocpol, 1980); something that it shares with influential 
comparative institutionalist strands such as Varieties of Capitalism (Bruff, 2011).  
Miliband’s account has much in common with other Gramscian currents which focus on 
the ‘hegemonic constellations’ of particular fractional concerns as they manoeuvre and clash in 
civil society (Plehwe et al, 2007). In turn, this is by no means incompatible with comparative-
institutionalist arguments, with the caveat that Marxist perspectives assume that capitalist interests 
will tend to be more powerful. However, we shift the focus away from these empirical power 
struggles, to emphasise the importance of universal and systematic policy imperatives which stem 
from the very nature of capitalist society.  
Marxist analysis should diverge sharply from pluralist and institutionalist perspectives, to 
stress the importance of what Clarke (1977) refers to as ‘capital relations as a principle of the unity 
of the social formation’. Policy systems exist, not necessarily under the duress of specific class 
actors, but within a society defined by a specific form of class relations. In other words, any 
capitalist state must inevitably ensure that the extraction and profitable reinvestment of surplus 
value on the part of capitalists can be maintained, otherwise crisis will ensue. While ‘class 
fractions’ may be able to pass off their own interests as synonymous with this general imperative, 
ultimately states are always to some degree having to guess about how best to sustain these 
conditions; success or failure is only apparent post hoc in the success of the economy or otherwise. 
In this sense its ability to perform a stabilising role is inevitably imperfect. While existing 
institutions may be important in explaining how capitalist extraction and reinvestment works in 
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different societies, it is inevitable that if they start to obstruct, rather than enable, this process, they 
will be forced to retract or change.  
Hence the most fundamental policy question from a Marxist perspective is not how to solve 
particular social problems, but how to operate in a way that is ‘adequate for a capitalist state’ (Offe, 
1975). In Offe’s (1975) analysis, this makes the capitalist state not so much functionalist as 
dysfunctionalist. This imperative is a basic fact of capitalist society, but they are generally 
obscured under a potentially limitless superstructure of competing demands from different 
empirical actors. Hence, while, following Block (1977), we may plausibly view state actors as the 
long term-oriented ‘managers’ of capitalism as opposed to the profit-oriented self-interest of 
capitalists themselves, it is often extremely difficult for policy makers to discern how to fulfil this 
role. 
We combine these Marxian questions with Kalecki’s (1943) insights into the themes of 
discipline and ‘business confidence’ in labour market policy. Like Offe, Kalecki (1943) shows 
how policy imperatives under capitalism can also be obscure and nebulous. But rather than simply 
leading to chaos, imperatives become crystallised in highly abstract concepts like ‘business 
confidence’. Such concepts become a way of converting profound uncertainty into a specific 
objective, however flawed, which can at least be acted upon. Thus, the desire to inflict disciplinary 
force upon the working class emerges intuitively as a concrete imperative, even if it may well 
undermine capitalist stability in the long run.  
‘[…] the maintenance of full employment would cause social and political changes 
which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business leaders.  Indeed, 
under a regime of permanent full employment, the 'sack' would cease to play its 
role as a 'disciplinary’ measure.  The social position of the boss would be 
undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class 
would grow.  ...  It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full 
employment than they are on the average under laissez-faire...  But 'discipline in 
the factories' and 'political stability' are more appreciated than profits by business 
leaders.  Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from 
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their point of view, and that unemployment is an integral part of the 'normal' 
capitalist system.’ 
 
The pursuit of business confidence through disciplinary labour market policies reflects the 
fundamental importance of class in capitalist society; not as an empirical interest coalition but as 
an underlying relationship and process which must be preserved at all costs. Disciplinary attacks 
on the working class are necessary in a society defined by capitalist class relations, but the 
consequences of them might well jeopardise the possibility of more stable ‘management’ of 
capitalism in the long run. Moreover, as we will argue in the following section, this contradiction 
is greatly magnified under conditions of ‘financialisation’- i.e. the increasing importance of 
financial markets in the global economy, and the growing interlinking of financial activity with 
the productive economy (Epstein, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2014).  
 
Financialisation, the collective capitalist, and disciplinary policies 
 
Carnoy and Castels (2001:6) have sought to explain the development of neoliberalism in 
Poulantzasian-functionalist terms. They argue that state policy played a key role in initiating 
neoliberal programmes in various countries, ‘not under the command of corporations, but certainly 
with corporate interests as a fundamental concern: this is the kind of policy that Poulantzas could 
have characterised as an expression of the relative autonomy of the state’. They go on, however, 
to depict this apparently functionalist act as precipitating a slide into dysfunction: ‘once the 
progress of globalisation was set in motion, it slipped largely out of the control of states’ (ibid, 
6)… ‘The state becomes dependent on the collective capitalist represented by global financial 
markets’ (ibid, 16). The latter, then, is not a particular agency but the cumulative ‘authority’ of 
thousands of individual profit-seeking decisions, their collective judgements exercising 
disciplinary force over the state. The consequent unknowability and unpredictability of the ‘logic’ 
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of financial markets has been well documented in scholarship well beyond Marxism (e.g. Vogl, 
2013; see also Besedovsky, 2015). 
We argue that financialisation has further weakened the ‘managerial’ capacities of the state. 
For Marx, there is something inherently obscure about financial capital; the ‘most irrational form 
of capital’ in which the ‘misrepresentation of productive relations’ reached its apotheosis (Marx, 
1981:516). The rise of the financialised ‘collective capitalist’ implies a more unpredictable pattern 
to capitalist investment, based on the tracking of free-floating price signals by multitudinous 
swarms of buyers and sellers, rather than more concrete productive investment (Harvey, 2013). 
For Carnoy and Castells (2001), the ‘information turbulence’ of financialisation degrades the 
technocratic capabilities of the state. It implies a more diffuse and opaque formation of the 
capitalist class- a ‘spectre’, to use Vogl’s (2013) words. We argue that this form of class power 
has greatly intensified the urge to impose disciplinary measures on the working class, forcing an 
ever-greater wedge between this short-term imperative and long-term stability.  
Financialisation, as Sinclair (1994a, 1994b, 2000) has argued, enforces an acceleration of 
state decision making, as ‘patient’ investment relationships are marginalised in favour of 
immediate returns (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Criteria for successful or unsuccessful 
policymaking is rendered less concrete, subject instead to the ‘collective power of opinion’ 
(Aglietta, 2000) of financial investors, rather than networks of power originating in the realm of 
production. Moreover, for Sinclair, the decline of patient bank-led investment creates gaps in the 
knowledge of potential investors. The proliferation of intermediary institutions such as credit 
ratings agencies is only a partial fix for this; they provide ‘scores’, which synthesise and 
impossibly vast range of highly subjective variables into a concrete figure. Hence, profound 
uncertainty is converted into fetishistic pseudo-certainty which can supposedly be used to quantify 
‘business confidence’. 
This means that policymakers have to try to gain the favourable judgement of a diffuse 
collective ‘actor’ (i.e. ‘the markets’), the cumulative decisions of which are inherently 
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unpredictable, since their criteria are ‘largely opaque to the outside world’ (Sinclair, 1994a:454), 
and generally not discernible a priori. Aside from ratings agencies and the like, financial markets 
also discipline states directly through institutions and phenomena such as government bond 
markets. These emerge as concrete disciplinary mechanisms (Onaran and Boesch, 2014), but the 
criteria that wins or loses the favour of such mechanisms are extremely hazy. 
Thus the inherently nebulous nature of capitalist governance is greatly exacerbated. Class 
remains the fundamental principle of capitalist governance, and this still results in a pre-occupation 
with business confidence. However, the ‘confidence’ of the financialised collective capitalist is 
manifested through very different channels than the highly personalised influence networks as 
described by Miliband (1969). States must seek the approval of a much more diffuse ‘agency’ 
which operates according to shorter time horizons, and which consequently heightens the 
contradiction between immediate-term disciplinary force and long term stability. Disciplinary 
techniques such as punitive ALMPs have been replicated in countries across Europe despite highly 
dubious empirical records and weak connections to actual ‘business needs’. Wage restraint has 
also been enforced on a pan-European level despite its destabilising implications. In both cases, 
hitherto-stable institutional systems have been hollowed out or ‘converted’ (Baccaro and Howell, 
2011) as a means of disciplining the working class and thus reassuring business confidence. In the 
process, once-widespread coordination mechanisms around wage policy and welfare institutions 
have, far from shaping and containing this process, been marginalised or subverted. These are the 
arguments we will illustrate in the following sections.  
 
Wage moderation policies and growth 
 
European wage policy has involved an intensifying emphasis on competitiveness, and the 
marginalisation of once-widespread institutions for coordinating wage policy. Wage restraint has 
been a key policy tool in European governance and has been strongly pushed by the European 
 [12] 
 
Commission (2012, 2013). While the common sense of policymakers dictates wage restraint as a 
key ingredient of economic competitiveness, it has a weak record in promoting stability, resulting 
in ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy agendas and the accumulation of debt dependency. However, it 
has also emerged as an immediate-term imperative in the face of demands to discipline European 
workforces and gain the confidence of financial investors and bond markets. 
Long before the crisis, Europe had experienced decades of increasing inequality and a 
diminishing share of national income accruing to labour (see figure one). However, while a new 
super rich class emerged over this period, a stable growth model did not. Even before 2008, no EU 
country had achieved high rates of employment. Moreover, declining wage share was associated 
with weaker and more volatile economic growth (see table one). Post-Kaleckians (e.g. Bhaduri 
and Marglin, 1990) view wage stagnation as a cause of instability, given the function of wages as 
a source of demand as well as a cost. Declining wage share can therefore lead to decreasing 
consumption which has not been outweighed by comparatively modest increases in private 
investment and exports (Onaran and Galanis, 2014). Moreover, the ‘race to the bottom’ in wage 
share as a route to ‘competitiveness’ has been self-defeating, as labour costs have fallen in many 
countries simultaneously. 
The EU countries provides substantial evidence for the post-Kaleckian argument (Hein and 
Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2006/7; Onaran and Obst, 2015; Stockhammer et al, 2009) 
These studies show that falling European wage share has only moderate benefits for trade balances 
and investment, but substantially negative effects on consumption, and an overall negative effect 
on aggregate demand. It has engendered an unstable symbiosis between debt-led consumption (e.g. 
in the UK and the European periphery) and export-led growth (e.g. in Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands). The crisis and recession, however, has not challenged the European emphasis on 
wage restraint which has only intensified in recent years (European Commission, 2012, 2013).  
This single-mindedness among European elites is remarkable, especially given growing 
recognition of the economic problems caused by inequality even in such environs as the World 
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Economic Forum (Onaran, 2014) and within the research departments of mainstream institutions 
like the IMF and OECD (Berg et al, 2012; Cingano, 2014). These problems are not at all new even 
to mainstream economic theory which highlights dangers such as the negative effects of credit 
market imbalances on human capital accumulation (Galor and Zeira, 1993); the ‘risks’ of public 
support for redistributive policies (Persson and Tabellini, 1994) and social instability as a deterrent 
to investment (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). But this awareness has not prevented the IMF from 
enforcing wage restraint as key demands in cases such as Greece, and neither have they, nor the 
financial crisis, altered the European Commission’s policy stance. 
In heterodox and Marxist literature, declining wage share has to be seen as a shift in the 
balance of power between labour and capital ( ILO, 2011; Jayadev, 2007; Kristal, 2010; Onaran, 
2009; Rodriguez and Jayadev, 2010; Stockhammer, 2013). In other words, it reflects a shifting 
balance of class forces, which has been catalysed in particular by financialisation. 
Financialisation’s demand for ‘shareholder value’ exerts direct pressure on wages at firm level 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Rossman, 2009). However, it also acts powerfully on state 
policymakers, requiring that they gain the confidence of bond markets and financial investors, 
through reassuring them that any challenge to profit extraction from labour will be defeated. This, 
we suggest, means that wage restraint must continue regardless of its long term failings.  
The comparative-institutionalist explanation for the stickiness of wage restraint policies 
refers to institutional inertia, particularly in hegemonic EU states like Germany (e.g. Hall, 2014). 
What this obscures, and what a class analysis recognises, is the way in which wage restraint has 
been a highly disruptive process in many cases, which has either undermined or subverted hitherto-
stable coordination mechanisms across Europe. In fact, in most European countries, regardless of 
differences in policy systems, we have seen expanding state unilateralism undermining labour’s 
capacity to win concessions via collective bargaining (Lethbridge et al, 2014). Where collective 
bargaining institutions have not been exited or dismantled, they have been subverted or ‘converted’ 
to facilitate a rebalancing of power in capital’s favour (Baccaro and Howell, 2011). In 
 [14] 
 
paradigmatic ‘coordinated’ economies, the push for competitiveness has led to the forceful 
disorganisation of coordination mechanisms (Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Holst, 2014). This is not 
to mention the wholesale institutional destruction wrought on those countries subjected to special 
measures by the Troika. Wage moderation in Europe has been repeatedly imposed through 
radically rolling back collective bargaining arrangements and worker rights.  
While comparative-institutionalism may well be correct that institutions can embed and 
stabilise national capitalist systems, a financialised ‘collective capitalist’ which demands quicker 
investment returns and allocates investment based on highly nebulous criteria of ‘confidence’ is 
another matter. Such a model demands that disciplinary force be exerted on workers; their 
opportunities for ‘voice’ must be marginalised. We stress again the diffuse and opaque nature of 
class power in this context, which severely limits the tools available to any ‘Bonapartist’ authority 
trying to restore stability.  We have seen that a whole range of mechanisms that serve as tools in 
this respect are off limits: international wage coordination, an end to ‘beggar thy neighbour’ 
competition, and bolstered demand via collective bargaining. They are not unavailable because of 
institutional inertia. Rather, they have been actively pushed aside. This is because such tools 
require the embedding of capital in stable institutions on a long-term basis, which we argue is an 
impossible demand under conditions of financialisation. It requires a process of institutional 
rebuilding and, more fundamentally, concerted action in pursuit of a defined goal; a prospect 
fundamentally at odds with the compressed time horizons and opaque judgements of the 
financialised ‘collective capitalist’.  
 
Punitive active labour market policies 
 
ALMPs are state-made mechanisms to assist or force jobless people into work. Welfare states 
previously served, to varying degrees, to decommodify labour by reducing the dependence of 
citizens on the market (Esping-Andersen 1990). ALMPs recommodify labour (Greer 2015) 
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through payments (e.g. to top up the wages of low-wage workers), services (e.g. training courses, 
make-work schemes, counselling, and job-placement arrangements), and other administrative 
requirements (e.g. submitting to an assessment, signing a job-seekers agreement, or accepting job 
offers). Advocates of ‘flexicurity’ support them because they may include investments in skills, 
generous payments to job seekers, and detailed interventions by social workers to tackle social 
exclusion. However, the ALMPs we are discussing are punitive, commonly classified as 
‘workfarist’ with a one-sided focus on placing clients in jobs quickly and sanctioning the non-
compliant (e.g. Peck 2002). Missing appointments, refusing a job offer or participation in a scheme 
can be grounds for temporarily stopping benefits, a potentially devastating punishment for low-
income people. For policymakers they ‘offset the negative impact of generous unemployment 
benefits on employment incentives’ (Venn, 2012).  
While the flexicurity agenda has stalled across Europe (Hayes 2012), punitive ALMPs 
have spread since the 1980s (Moreira and Lodemel, 2014; Scherschel et al, 2012). In Britain they 
took shape gradually, as part of a ‘stricter benefits regime’ in the 1980s, via the ‘New Deal’ of 
1997, where participation in training or make-work schemes became mandatory. These 
requirements have extended beyond the core clientele of young people and long-term unemployed; 
being applied to lone parents and certain disabled people as of 2009, and backed up by sanctions 
which increased fourfold under the Conservative-led government of 2010. In Germany, the process 
was more sudden, via a package of reforms implemented in 2002-5, primarily the Hartz laws. 
These created a new means-tested benefit imposing work requirements and sanctions on diverse 
clientele including long-term unemployed job seekers and groups previously classified as 
'inactive’. They increased the range of jobs claimants can ‘reasonably’ be expected to take, while 
legalising various forms of precarious employment. To varying degrees all European countries 
have watered down welfare entitlements, increased work requirements, and enforced these 
changes at the street level.  
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Punitive ALMPs are an instance of subordinating social policy to the needs of capital, since they 
aim to increasing the disciplinary threat of unemployment (Wiggan, 2015), putting downward 
pressure on wages (Nickell, 1997). However, following four decades of experimentation, even 
sympathetic observers note that evidence on the effects of ALMPs is mixed. In the vast quantitative 
literature evaluating particular schemes, meta-analyses find generally positive effects on 
employment, although these depend on the kind of client and kind of scheme; weak if any effects 
on income; and no overall conclusion on the overall costs and benefits of these programmes (Card 
et al, 2010). Blank (2003) notes numerous difficulties in gauging the effects of ALMPs on labour 
supply. Another influential German advocate, Schmid (2008), concedes that the evidence for 
positive effects is meagre and their contribution to limiting unemployment ‘modest’. 
One problem is that clients typically come from groups against which employers 
discriminate, and ALMPs themselves do not rectify this issue (Holzer and Stoll, 2001). Punitive 
ALMPs may indeed exacerbate discrimination by stigmatising their recipients as a member of a 
group targeted for intervention, what Castel (2003) calls the ‘handicapology’ of the welfare state.  
Moreover, there are problems with using a politically charged and highly bureaucratic tool to 
intervene in the private economy. In the UK, employers using mandatory job placements have 
been targeted by activists and have pulled out to avoid reputational damage (Greer 2015), UK 
employers report excessive paperwork (Ingold and Stuart, 2014), and employers participating in 
local workforce policy are not mainly from the sectors hiring jobless welfare claimants (McGurk 
and Meredith, 2015). While UK employers are less engaged than their counterparts elsewhere 
(Martin, 2004), the problem is a general one observed across Europe (Larsen and Vesan, 2012). In 
addition, these policies diffuse between states and countries far more quickly than a proper 
evaluation of results would allow (Peck, 2002), and with little regard for differences in context 
(Dwyer and Ellison, 2009). 
There are further administrative barriers to ‘activating’ disadvantaged clients even where 
employers are engaged. Make-work or employer placements may engender ‘displacement’ or 
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‘substitution’ effects in which employers use schemes to avoid hiring workers with regular 
employment contracts, even in Germany where schemes must be certified as ‘additional’ and for 
the ‘public good’ (Koch et al, 2011). Job placement schemes governed by numerical targets or 
payment by results may also be plagued by ‘dead-weight’ and ‘creaming and parking’ effects in 
which they serve and place in jobs mainly the job ready (Rees et al, 2014). ALMPs – and not only 
punitive ones – have generated dilemmas that policymakers have not solved in four decades of 
experimentation. 
While these interventions may not increase the number of disadvantaged job seekers hired 
by employers, they could still increase the pressure on job-ready individuals to enter the labour 
market and leave the benefits system. There is some evidence that job seekers are willing to accept 
a lower income- i.e. below the level of benefits payments- in order to exit the benefits system and 
its requirements (Doerre et al, 2013), and that sanctioning reduces post-unemployment income 
(Van de Klaauw and Van Ours, 2013). Following the Hartz reforms there was a decline in 
voluntary quits, reflecting fear of entering the new and highly stigmatized stratum of means-tested 
benefits claimants (Knuth, 2011). Whatever their administrative malfunctions, ALMPs may 
therefore still exert discipline on welfare claimants, job seekers, and job holders (Greer, 2015). 
There is an element of deliberate disruption built into punitive active labor market policies. 
This may be most obvious in Britain, where politicians have over the years repeatedly touted the 
radical character of the reforms they proposing, whether it Blair’s New Deals starting in 1997 that 
required that young claimants to participate in activation schemes, the extension of these 
requirements to single mothers and disabled people after 2008, or their extension to claimants of 
in-work benefits under the Universal Credit being rolled out in 2015. But it is also disruptive 
elsewhere. In Varieties of Capitalism the welfare state is an instrument that helps to resolve 
employers’ collective action problem of skill provision; in coordinated market economies such as 
Germany they want to avoid disrupting the status-securing unemployment insurance system 
because it allows them to shed labour without destroying skills. Punitive active labour market 
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policies disrupt this principle, most notably by requiring claimants to take jobs even if they are 
lower-wage and lower-skill than in the past. Among the goals of the Hartz reforms, for example, 
were to weaken the status securing function of the welfare state for so-called labour market insiders 
while creating a low-wage economy to increase labor market participation (Hassel and Schiller 
2010); the consequence was a rapid increase of nonstandard work (Brinkmann et al 2006).  
If participation in ALMP schemes is not attractive to particular employers or employer 
groups, and if they are not congruent with existing national systems, why do punitive ALMPs 
persist? In part, they may have been sustained by political feedback mechanisms, in that imposing 
new requirements on the unemployed reinforces negative views in society of welfare claimants as 
well as the view that the welfare state is too generous (Soss & Schram, 2007). By dividing the 
population into hard-working families and parasitic welfare scroungers, policy discourse serves to 
undermine working class solidarity (Scherschel et al, 2012). Punitive ALMPs may also be a by-
product of austerity, in that public investment in training or detailed schemes to combat social 
exclusion are more expensive than schemes aimed at quick job outcomes for the job ready, and 
sanctions reduce benefits payments. Most significantly for our purposes, however, they contain a 
clear intention to institutionalize low-wage and precarious work and to impose the disciplines of 
work on prospective workers; the ‘common sense’ of financialized capitalism thus cuts against 
labour decommodification. 
Punitive ALMPs are intended to discipline the unemployed, with an aim of promoting a 
flexible low-cost labour supply. They serve a short-term purpose of conveying the subordination 
of social policy to the needs of employers, despite their actual disconnect with the human resource 
strategies of low-wage employers. They are not merely the products of distinct policy systems but 
have spread into jurisdictions often classified as very different, including both Germany and the 
UK, with a clear emphasis on disruption of past institutional arrangements.   
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion has examined two policies, wage restraint and punitive active labour 
market policy, that have persisted and proliferated despite weak empirical results. These policies 
are not simply implemented on the diktat of concrete actors constituting the ‘capitalist class’, but 
rather are an attempt by the state to re-kindle ‘business confidence’ by exerting disciplinary 
measures on workers. In enacting them, states themselves are competing to win the favour of a 
diffuse ‘collective capitalist’ which operates according to compressed time horizons. We have 
argued that these are consequently highly short-termist policy agendas which will fail to resolve 
the problem of capitalist instability in the longer term. But they reflect underlying imperatives 
stemming from the class nature of all capitalist societies. 
When comparing this period to the one following the Second World War, we are led to ask 
why the kind of demand management and economic coordination policies implemented then are 
now discarded as options. In answering this question, we have argued that financialisation greatly 
deepens the contradiction between short and long term, and has engendered a more diffuse class 
power in the form of the collective capitalist that impels states into short-termist disciplinary 
measures.  Financialization and capital mobility crucially narrows the area of manoeuvre of the 
states to stabilize capitalism and to create new embedding institutions. Financialized and 
multinational capital does not want to give up its fall back options in return for a more stable 
economy. Furthermore, financial markets have a disciplining power over the states in pushing 
particular class interests through state policies and they have a punitive power when states attempt 
to reverse these policies.  
As Block (1977) has argued, the state has to seek to ensure stable capitalist accumulation, 
but it cannot know for certain what policies will lead to these conditions. It can receive signals and 
information and it can be influenced, but how this happens is contested. We have argued that under 
financialisation, the opacity and compressed time horizons of the collective capitalist have led 
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States all over Europe to pursue the highly nebulous aim of business confidence as an overarching 
policy goal. This disciplinary imperative may well prevent stability in the long term. Indeed, as 
Boyer (2015) has noted, the policy priorities repeatedly presented as immediate term imperatives 
since the 2008 crisis have often directly contradicted the objective of re-establishing stable growth. 
Both wage moderation and ALMPs are disciplinary measures which, in Offe’s (1975) terminology 
could be considered ‘positive selections’ (i.e. imperatives). Conversely, those policy tools such as 
demand management mechanisms, welfare institutions and collective bargaining systems are 
‘negative selections’ (i.e. negative imperatives) insofar as they enhance the bargaining power of 
workers. Instead, they have been undermined and converted to the ends of furthering capitalist 
power over workers, however conspicuously this contradicts their original spirit (Baccaro and 
Howell, 2011).  
We have demonstrated above that the institutional regulation of work is not simply the 
product of ideas or empirical interest coalitions, but absolute imperatives inherent in the class 
nature of capitalist society. For the comparative institutionalist literature, the pattern of 
policymaking after the crisis is a puzzle because it is not consistent with a general account of path 
dependence: punitive policies aimed at the working class spread, while others that served to protect 
the working class declined. From a Marxist and Kaleckian perspective it is readily explainable. 
While fundamental Marxist operationalizations of class are commonly used in the literature on the 
labour process within organizations, much could be learned by extending them to comparative 
treatments of the political economy of work. 
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Figure 1: Wage shares in GDP, 1960-2013 
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Note: Adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost (source: AMECO). 
 
Table 1: Average growth of real GDP 
1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2007 2008-2013
United Kingdom 2.90 2.42 2.48 2.18 3.17 -0.28
Euro area (12 countries) 5.29 3.78 2.27 2.12 2.16 -0.28
Source: AMECO 
 
 
